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Abstract: The question of whether fish can experience pain or any other feelings can only be 
resolved by neurobiologically targeted experiments. This commentary summarizes why this is 
essential for resolving scientific debates about consciousness in other animals, and offers specific 
experiments that need to be done: (i) those that evaluate the rewarding and punishing effects of 
specific brain regions and systems (for instance, with deep-brain stimulation); (ii) those that 
evaluate the capacity of animals to regulate their affective states; and (iii) those that have direct 
implications for human affective feelings, with specific predictions — for instance, the development 
of new treatments for human affective disorders. 
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Key’s (2016) key proposition is that “it is impossible to ever know what a fish feels.” This is 
reminiscent of LeDoux’s (2012, p. 666) nonscientific assertion that “we will never know what an 
animal feels.” Empirical predictions or lack thereof, not absolute declarations of what exists or 
does not exist in the world, are where this discussion needs to be situated. Key argues against 
the seemingly soft-minded belief that fish feel pain, at least based just on the simple studies of 
behavioral nociceptive (pain) reflexes which, in his estimation (and mine), do not constitute 
adequate scientific evidence for experiential states. In any event, discussions of how the spinal 
cord disconnected from the brain can still manifest nociceptive reflexes, automatically taking 
the body away from harmful stimuli, do not constitute compelling evidence one way or the 
other. Unfelt spinal reflexes can probably remove the body from harm’s way without the need 
for feelings, but such evidence is inadequate for determining what may be happening elsewhere 
in the brain.  
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Affective (valenced) feelings are clearly elaborated by higher subcortical and paleocortical 
networks to sustain affectively guided learned behavioral patterns rather than simple reflexes. 
The evidence is quite substantial that subcortical limbic and upper brainstem circuits are 
sufficient for affectively experienced mental life, at least in mammals, where the necessary 
brain research has been done (Panksepp, 1998).  
 
Key denies that “fish should be given the ‘benefit of the doubt’ and unconditionally bestowed 
with the ability to feel pain.” He is scientifically correct: Neither behavioral evidence, nor 
empathy alone, is sufficient to resolve this issue. In rigorous science, general conclusions — for 
example, that animals feel their emotional arousals — have to be based on abundant 
predictions that lead to convergent evidence for any novel conclusion that is put forward. That 
criterion has, I believe, been satisfied for emotional feelings in all mammals that have been 
extensively studied with relevant brain manipulation approaches (e.g., deep brain stimulation, 
both electrical and chemical: Panksepp, 1981, 1982) — although, as noted earlier, many 
behavioral neuroscientists still believe that we can never know what non-speaking animals feel. 
 
My own research has been devoted to studying emotional affective (feeling) states in animals, 
rather than sensory or homeostatic affects (which are less empirically tractable). My criteria 
have been simple:   
 
(i) If one can evoke coherent emotional action patterns by stimulating specific regions 
of animal brains, across species (quite easy to do), and those evoked states serve as 
rewards and punishments in simple learning tasks (which has been abundantly 
affirmed), then the data support the probable existence of affective experiences 
(Panksepp, 1998). Why? Because we humans do not have any rewards or 
punishments that we do not experience as either “desirable/“good” or 
undesirable/“bad” (Panksepp, 1982, 1998), and the evidence that one needs an 
expansive anthropoid neocortex for emotional feelings is nil.  
(ii) Those same brain manipulations should produce corresponding types of feelings in 
humans, and there is abundant evidence that they do  (for an early summary, see 
Panksepp, 1985, and see Damasio et al., 2000, for comparable neural correlates for 
human emotional feeling in homologous human brain regions with PET imaging 
[fMRI is less adequate for monitoring feelings]).  
(iii) This knowledge should be sufficient to guide the development of new psychiatric 
treatments, and that project is achieving successes (Panksepp et al., 2015; Panksepp 
& Yovell, 2015; Panksepp, 2015; Yovell et al., 2015). In addition, it has long been 
known that other animals get addicted to the same drugs as humans; to our 
surprise, crayfish also “choose” to go back to places where they received 
amphetamines/cocaine or morphine (Huber et al., 2011). That should clearly be 
tried in fish too (for precedents, see Collier et al., 2014; Lau et al., 2006). Direct 
brain stimulation would be harder. 
 
Surely there will never be “proof” that other mammals experience affective states in exactly the 
ways that we do, rather than in their own homologous ways, and there is enough data to make 
Animal Sentience 2016.031:  Panksepp Commentary on Key on Fish Pain 
3 
 
the latter a credible provisional conclusion. Science does not deal with “proof” but only with 
“the weight of the evidence,” comparing different novel differential predictions following from 
competing hypotheses. All we will ever have is the weight of evidence for one interpretation of 
the world or another. The one that makes the best predictions should “win.” I am not sure what 
Key’s upper brain predictions might be. Spinal cord analyses will not suffice, nor will claims that 
painful feelings are simply generated by the cortex. The cortex participates in many feelings, 
especially sensory ones, but there is too much evidence for subcortical loci of control for various 
other feelings in animals — for all basic emotions and some for homeostatic imbalances like 
hunger and thirst, which are likewise felt states — to dismiss them. The subcortical locus of 
control is supported by many radical decortication studies (e.g., Panksepp et al., 1994; 
Valenstein, 1966). The issue of feelings in anencephalic children remains completely open (see 
Merker, 2007, and discussants), despite Key’s deconstruction.  
 
I was a bit chagrined that Key spent so much time denying that any form of consciousness can 
exist below the cortex. Obviously it can: Moruzzi and Magoun’s (1949) classic demonstrations 
showed that massive damage of the reticular formation eliminates all indices of sentience in 
animals. This was preceded by the finding that massive damage of the Periaqueductal Gray 
(PAG) can pretty much erase all behavioral indices of consciousness in several species of 
mammals (Baily & Davis, 1942, 1943) as well as the few humans that have had such unfortunate 
brain damage (Schiff, 2007). In any case, the issue of anencephalic children with clear waking 
states also remains completely open, since often the remaining cortical fragments are highly 
gliotic and probably dysfunctional (Shewmon et al., 1999).   
 
Surely Key would acknowledge that there is abundant inferential behavioral evidence that fish 
might be feeling pain. From this perspective, I was disappointed that Key did not cover the most 
compelling behavioral studies suggestive of pain in fish (e.g., Jones et al., 2012; Sneddon, 2009; 
Sneddon et al., 2003a, 2003b). In any event, the possibility of pain in fish has yet to be tested 
with the most robust strategies — namely neurobiological ones.1 Those are the most compelling 
approaches — and in fish research, there has been little research at that level.    
 
If one takes the more humble approach to this topic, the strictly empirical one, then the issue of 
pain in fish remains as open a question as before Key’s well-argued denial of affective processes 
                                                        
1Some of my statements in this commentary could be interpreted as implying that I believe pain in animal research 
is justified. I did believe that as a young scientist (at the lowest possible intensity levels, to answer important 
scientific questions, for instance, involving standard injections of drugs), and I still feel that such sacrifices for solid 
scientific knowledge are justifiable though open to debate. During my academic career, I chose mostly to pursue 
animal research that involved no pain, with heavy emphasis on positive emotions. For personal reasons, from 1998 
onward, I have only participated in animal experiments involving no pain, except for standard injections of drugs: 
Perhaps the last experiments that involved more than injection and standard surgical stress were conducted in 
Panksepp (1980), in which I used tail-shock to identify the threshold for squeaking in infant rats — at levels that I 
could barely detect on my fingertips. The finding was that simply holding the rats would eliminate the squeaking, 
which highlights how social touch is analgesic. I did study the primal emotions of fear (FEAR) and separation distress 
(PANIC), but I have restricted practically all of my research to positive emotions since then, especially PLAY, which 
included the tickling of perhaps a thousand juvenile rats. One of our favorite findings is that tickling rats makes 
them better experimental subjects (Cloutier et al., 2012). 
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in fish-brained creatures. Although the data stream for painful qualia in fish is more modest 
than for mammals, there is abundant evidence for a diversity of emotional feeling in common 
laboratory mammals (Panksepp, 1982, 1998, 2011a, 2011b), and the most compelling data have 
arisen from relevant brain manipulations. Similar strategies deserve to be implemented in fish 
research. Thus, the issue addressed by Key remains wide open for future empirical resolution.  
 
It is noteworthy that it is easier scientifically to conclude that something exists than that it does 
not. Thus, closure on such important questions remains premature. The weight-of-evidence for 
experiences of aversive and rewarding emotional feelings in animals remains substantial, and 
with abundant clinical implications (Panksepp, 2015; Panksepp & Biven, 2012). If comparable 
studies were conducted in fish, I anticipate that credible neuroscientific evidence for some kind 
of aversive pain-type feelings could be demonstrated, especially since the experience of pain 
probably evolved to protect the body in anticipatory ways and thereby automatically predict 
survival trajectories when there are still opportunities to escape/avoid destruction.  
 
The key issue is: Can extreme points of view on this topic be differentiated with neurobiological 
approaches? I think they can. Would Key be willing to interpret rewarding and punishing 
subcortical brain circuits in mammalian brains as evidence for certain feelings? If they remain 
intact after radical decortication, would that not be consistent with a subcortical locus of 
control? Further, since fish nociceptive responses are modulated by opioids (Sneddon, 2009), 
consider the following critical experiment: Rodent studies have shown that when sustained 
putative pain is inflicted on rats, if given the chance, they will self-administer (consume) more 
opioids than rats not undergoing nociceptive stimuli/states (Martin et al., 2007). I assume that 
Key might predict that fish will not self-administer opioids under such presumptive states of 
pain. If such experiments were conducted in fish (much harder in aquatic organisms), and the 
fish learned to self-administer more opioids, would Key be willing to agree that the weight of 
evidence was swinging toward the existence of aversion/pain-related central states in fish 
brains? If not, why not? In any event, differential predictions provide compelling scientific 
differentiation of views that could help resolve the affective problem at hand. The fact that 
cortical systems process such feelings into complex decision-making and other higher brain 
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